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Abstract 
Ecological objectives in environmental reports usually promise a high degree of environmenta l 
awareness in a company’s activities. Several studies have already highlighted that most 
companies do not keep their promises since stakeholders’ expectations and a company’s 
capabilities for internal adjustments do not match all the time. Thus, a company might use 
strategic reporting in order not to endanger its legitimacy. However, no study so far has 
demonstrated how companies use different legitimacy strategies in reporting their 
environmental objectives over time. To achieve this in our study, we focus primarily on findings 
from legitimacy theory in combination with the legitimacy strategies suggested by Lindblom 
(2010). To test our theoretical framework empirically, we analyze 260 corporate environmenta l 
reports between the years 2000 to 2014 of German DAX companies by coding all disclosed 
objectives within these reports. Based on this longitudinal approach we are able to identify 
reporting patterns of the different companies that provide insights into those companies’ 
environmental reporting legitimacy strategies. Overall, this study contributes to research on 
voluntary disclosure by showing that a comprehensive analysis of the reporting pattern of 
disclosed objectives allows the identification of certain legitimacy strategies.  
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Introduction 
RWE, a large German electric utilities company, announced in its environmental report of the 
year 2007 that it would expand the installed power of renewable energies at its disposal by 4.5 
gigawatts by 2012. This objective was pursued in the following years’ reports; however, 
without any notification, RWE changed the target time for the objective to 2014 and reduced 
the extent to 4.3 gigawatts. In 2015, the actual installed power of renewable energies was 4.2 
gigawatts only (RWE AG 2016). All changes made and the non-compliance with the objective 
were not communicated in any reports. Since we consider this reporting style as not transparent, 
the question arises whether RWE follows a strategic approach in its communication that is 
supposed to mislead stakeholders. Such an approach is often referred to as “greenwashing”. 
Does RWE use greenwashing to legitimate its operations against stakeholders? 
Legitimacy theory assumes that companies’ survival depends on whether the society in which 
they operate recognizes that their activities conform to its value system or not (Gray et al. 1996). 
Thus from a strategic point of view, a company is able to influence its legitimacy status by 
communicating its behavior to its environment (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Several authors 
have differentiated these legitimacy strategies in substantive (actions are transformed to 
conform to social values) and symbolic (no transformation of actions but symbolling to conform 
to social values) (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Deegan 2006; Richardson 1985). Lindblom (2010) 
builds on this idea by further differentiating and explicitly describing four legitimacy strategies 
in regards to companies’ corporate environmental reporting (CER)1. While the first legitimacy 
                                                                 
 
1 The wide variety of terms and definitions relating to non-financial/voluntary disclosure asks for an exact 
delimitation. In general, topics concerning corporate social responsibility are disclosed in corporate sustainability 
reporting, which usually includes the dimensions ecological and social, sometimes complemented by financial 
issues (for an overview, see Hahn and Kühnen 2013). Since we exclusively focus on the ecological dimension of 
voluntary disclosure, we use the term corporate environmental reporting (CER) hereafter. Yet, because CER is 
part of the larger concept corporate sustainability reporting, and to avoid inaccuracy, we us e the term CER also 
when authors were originally referring to both dimensions ecological and social. Likewise, when speaking of 
environmental reports as our research subject, this includes both pure environmental reports and sustainability 
reports in which we coded only environmental elements (Stray 2008). 
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strategy comprises honest and transparent communication of the stakeholders’ requirements 
and needs that have been fulfilled by the company (substantive), Lindblom highlights three 
kinds of legitimacy strategies that try to manipulate stakeholders’ perception and expectation 
of a company without making internal adjustments (symbolic).A company may not apply just 
one of these strategies in their CER but two or even all of them.  
One key element of any CER are the disclosed objectives, which are statements about a future 
intention that contain a clear subject, extent and time period. As such, companies can use 
objectives to apply “greenwashing” on the pretext of informing stakeholders about future 
actions in regard to the ecological environment, because it is difficult for stakeholders to 
identify transparent reporting (Delmas and Burbano 2011; Fukukawa et al. 2007; Marquis et al. 
2016). Whether companies communicate their objectives in a comprehensible and consistent 
way and, thus, report them transparently, is not part of any official audit. Although the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) established certain principles for companies that call on consistency 
and comparability in reporting (GRI 2015), it does not evaluate if companies pursue the claimed 
objectives.  
The question as to whether companies communicate transparently in their CER has been 
examined in a number of studies, but has not yet been comprehensively clarified (for an 
overview, see Hahn and Kühnen 2013). Researchers have highlighted that companies’ CER is 
often characterized by a self-laudatory tone (Archel et al. 2008; Holder-Webb et al. 2009). 
Although the voluntary disclosure of negative aspects in environmental reports seems not to 
have an impact on stock price or investment decision (Reimsbach and Hahn 2015), scholars 
have shown that companies use impression management strategies to avoid transparency 
regarding these negative incidents (Criado-Jiménez et al. 2008; Hahn and Lülfs 2014). 
However, despite the intense research on transparency in CER, no study so far, to our 
knowledge, has focused on the identification of the strategic approach of demonstrating 
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legitimacy when analyzing the transparency in terms of the disclosed objectives over time. This 
is remarkable because objectives play a decisive role when it comes to stakeholders’ 
expectations. By disclosing objectives companies can show that their planned interna l 
adjustments coincide with stakeholders’ expectations (Parsons 1956a; Parsons 1956b; Suchman 
1995). Furthremore, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) show—from a theoretical perspective—the 
option for companies to disclose objectives in line with stakeholders’ expectations, while 
actually pursuing objectives that are less acceptable to stakeholders. A company reporting this 
way can be clearly identified as not transparent in disclosing its objectives. In line with this, we 
state there is a high level of transparency when a company discloses and pursues its objectives 
in a comprehensible and consistent way over time (Nienaber et al. 2015). 
This study focuses on the transparency of companies’ disclosed objectives, which we analyze 
over a time period of 15 years to identify reporting patterns that lead to the company’s 
legitimacy strategy. With the help of legitimacy theory, we design a theoretical framework that 
allows us to draw conclusions from the reporting patterns towards particular legitimacy 
strategies suggested by Lindblom (2010) when disclosing objectives.  
To conduct this analysis, we use a qualitative content analysis of German DAX companies’ 
environmental reports for the years 2000 to 2014. We focus on DAX companies because 
Germany has relatively strict regulation in terms of annual reporting and ecological standards, 
which allow us to work with a sample of environmental reports that are all governed by the 
same set of regulatory requirements. Our sample numbers 260 reports. Within these reports, we 
identify all disclosed objectives and code them according to three indicators: the level of 
transparency in CER objectives, which indicates how far a company pursues the disclosed 
objectives in a comprehensible and consistent way over time; the number of objectives that 
shows how ambitious a company discloses its objectives; and the thematic focus (topic) that 
helps to understand whether or not a company discloses objectives in line with stakeholders’ 
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expectations. The collected data is consolidated and assessed over the period of 15 years in 
order to evaluate each company’s reporting pattern. This longitudinal approach is of great 
importance because stakeholders are not able to assess transparency themselves by reading only 
a single report, given that the objectives can be evaluated only after a delay of several years and 
with significant effort. Furthermore, we apply a cluster analysis in order to identify companies 
showing similar characteristics in their reporting of objectives.  
Our results demonstrate that four groups of companies exist in regard to their reporting 
behavior: the Signaler, the Greenwasher, the Unconcerned, and the Incapable. We find 
evidence that most of the DAX companies apply, to some extent, legitimacy strategies when 
reporting objectives in their CER. While the Signaler report their success or failure in achieving 
their disclosed objectives mainly in a comprehensible and consistent way, we can identify a 
tendency in relation to some companies in the groups Greenwasher and Unconcerned to apply 
misleading strategies that are supposed to change the stakeholders’ perception in regard to the 
companies’ internal adjustments. For the companies in the group Incapable, we cannot reveal 
a clear strategy. 
In sum, we make two contributions to research on voluntary disclosure. First, we apply the well-
known legitimacy strategies by Lindblom (2010) on a particular element of CER, namely the 
disclosed objectives. This leads to a deeper understanding of the strategies used in CER. 
Second, we show that a comprehensive analysis of the objectives’ reporting pattern in terms of 
transparency allow for further conclusions regarding the applied legitimacy strategies. In this 
way, we are able to examine the extent to which the four legitimacy strategies apply to our 
data..  
In the following section on the theoretical background, we discuss strategies used in CER to 
reach the status of legitimacy. Then, we explain our methodological approach of data collection, 
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coding and analysis over the time span of 15 years. Following, we reveal our findings and 
discuss them, before we highlight managerial implications and provide a short conclusion.  
Theoretical background  
Systems-oriented theories 
In line with Gray et al. (1996), we take into account systems-oriented theories, which allow 
scholars to study the role of information and disclosure by examining the relation a company 
has to other companies, the government, individuals or groups. Systems-oriented theories are 
grounded on the idea that an organization is a part of a larger social system, which influences 
the organization in its practices and vice versa. Therefore, a company’s disclosure practices are 
best understood when paying attention to an organization’s context (Gray et al. 1996). In this 
study, we focus on the German DAX companies to ensure that all companies have the same  
context in terms of disclosure requirements, international activity, and level of sales and size. 
Three systems-oriented theories help to understand why CER is of relevance for companies : 
Legitimacy theory reflects how certain disclosure strategies are used by organizations to gain, 
maintain or repair legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman 2011; Suchman 1995). As such, this paper 
mainly builds on legitimacy theory. It is supplemented by stakeholder theory that deals with 
the expectations of an organization’s CER by particular stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, 
Agle, & Wood, 1997) and institutional theory that focuses on the question of how 
organizational forms are adopted to bring legitimacy to an organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Smith et al., 2011). These theories complement each other in the 
analysis of an organization’s disclosure practices with different levels of resolution of 
perception (Gray et al. 1995). In the following, we will describe these theories in detail. 
Legitimacy theory has become one of the most cited theories within the environmenta l 
accounting area (Hahn and Kühnen 2013). This theory assumes that companies’ surviva l 
depends on whether the society in which they operate recognizes that their activities conform 
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to its value system or not (Gray et al. 1996). The idea behind this assumption is that an 
organization does not have inherent rights to resources. Thus, legitimacy granted by society 
gives an organization the right to use resources. According to legitimacy theory, a social 
contract exists between an organization and society. This social contract represents the external 
expectations that propose how an organization has to operate to receive social validat ion 
(Deegan and Unerman 2011). If a social contract is not fulfilled, legal, economic and social 
sanctions are the consequences (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). For example, since the Japanese 
nuclear accident in 2011 both electric utilities within the DAX, REW and E.ON, are confronted 
with expectations to eliminate nuclear energy. Because the social contract is currently still not 
fulfilled, economic and legal sanctions have been implemented in Germany in recent years. 
CER is a tool an organization can use to legitimate its activities. Researchers, such as Laine 
(2010), Cho (2009), Tilling and Tilt (2010) and Lindblom (2010) have examined how 
companies use their CER to manage legitimacy. According to legitimacy theory, a crucial role 
of corporate disclosure is to legitimate the existence of a company (Lindblom 2010; Dowling 
and Pfeffer 1975). O’Dwyer (2002) demonstrates that Irish managers’ prime motivation behind 
corporate disclosure is the enhancement of corporate legitimacy. Hopwood (2009) also found 
that companies use CER in order to increase their legitimacy or to facilitate a new and different 
image. A distance between stakeholders’ expectations and internal adjustments is called a 
legitimacy gap (O'Donovan 2002). The gap arises from how stakeholders expect companies to 
act in comparison to how they perceive that companies do act (O'Donovan 2002; Deegan and 
Unerman 2011). 
As explained above, CER has a strong link to stakeholders’ expectations (stakeholder theory). 
Stakeholders’ expectations are the reason organizations disclose information in regard to their 
environmental activities. Following Freeman (1984), we define a stakeholder as any group or 
individual who can affect, or be affected by, the achievement of a firm’s targets. Stakeholders 
are the reason organizations have to disclose information at all—since they have to demonstrate 
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the basis of their legitimacy. The observed pattern of voluntary disclosure is found to be 
consistent with the managerial branch of stakeholder theory (Oliveira et al. 2013). Stakeholders 
control resources a company may need to be successful. The more critical stakeholder resources 
are, the higher is the level of stakeholders’ expectations that have to be addressed by the 
company (Roberts 1992). If an organization is not able to fulfil the stakeholders’ expectations, 
it loses the basis of its legitimacy. Through voluntary disclosure, organizations can improve 
their reputation (an important resource for them) by negotiating with and influenc ing 
stakeholders. In Germany, the general topics that stakeholders expect from a DAX company 
are made explicit in a list published by the GRI. The GRI mentions 34 topics that have been 
declared as standard for companies when reporting their ecological activities (GRI 2015). 
Institutional theory has been used primarily in organizational studies and explains how and why 
environments influence an organization to conform to external expectations. Organizations seek 
to demonstrate—for example by communicating—their activities in accordance with what is 
perceived to be appropriate behavior by the environment, e.g. stakeholders. Two key aspects of 
this theory are important for our study. First, Meyer and Rowan (1977) showed that external 
expectations and internal efficiency do not always conform with each other and thus 
organizations decouple their formal and informal activities to be perceived as acting in 
accordance with external expectations without harming internal efficiency. Second, following 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), isomorphism mechanisms affect organizations. Coercive 
isomorphism drives organizations towards the practice of greater homogeneity to deal with 
pressure from society. Mimetic isomorphism refers to a company’s tendency to imitate another 
company’s structure or processes because of the belief that this structure or process is more 
beneficial than their own. Normative isomorphism describes how companies become similar 
due to pressure that stems from professionalization, e.g. similar education. Under institutiona l 
theory, an organization seeking social validation is expected to act in accordance with external 
expectations. Social validation is mandatory for an organization’s legitimacy, and thus for it to 
11 
 
achieve stability, access resources and to improve its chances of survival (Larrinaga-Gonzá lez 
2007; Moll et al. 2006).  
Strategic disclosure 
In our study, we build on these three systems-oriented theories when analyzing how companies 
disclose objectives in their CER and thus show what kind of disclosure strategies these 
companies chose. According to legitimacy strategy, this choice depends on a company’s 
disclosure aim—to gain, to maintain or to repair legitimacy (Suchman 1995). In the case of the 
regular and voluntary disclosure of DAX companies within their CER, companies usually aim 
at maintaining legitimacy. However, maintaining legitimacy is at risk when stakeholders’ 
expectations cannot be fulfilled through sufficient internal adjustments. In this case, companies 
may want to mislead stakeholders in relation to their environmental practices.  
If we look at legitimacy theory from a strategic perspective, companies are able to influence 
their legitimacy status through certain actions (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). In CER, these 
actions are the way a company communicates its behavior in regard to the environment. A 
company might communicate either reactively or proactively (Lindblom 2010). Reactive 
communication is applied when a company has to respond to stakeholder complaints to narrow 
a legitimacy gap. Proactive communication aims at using regular disclosure to prevent a 
legitimacy gap arising.  Companies use CER as the main tool for this regular disclosure. 
When companies proactively address stakeholders’ expectations, it is very important for them 
to disclose objectives in their CER. Lindblom points out that “the relevant publics continuous ly 
evaluate corporate output, methods, and goals against an ever evolving expectation” (Lindblom 
2010, p. 52). Other researchers in the field of organizational legitimacy also highlight the 
importance of objectives that match stakeholders’ expectations for maintaining legitimacy 
(Parsons 1956a; Parsons 1956b; Suchman 1995). However, taking a strategic perspective, it is 
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important to address how companies use objectives to present themselves as legitimate to the 
stakeholders. 
Lindblom (2010) distinguishes four proactive legitimacy strategies that, when reporting 
environmental issues, can be utilized by companies to maintain legitimacy. When defining these 
legitimacy strategies, Lindblom builds on the findings of institutional and stakeholder theory 
by relating the internal adjustments of a company to the external expectations of the 
stakeholder. In the following, we explain each of the four legitimacy strategies and show how 
they can be applied to CER’s objectives.  
Strategy 1. This strategy can be applied only when a company is actually able to fulfill the 
expectations of its stakeholders and make the internal adjustments that are reported. Thus, 
the disclosed objectives comply with those actual internal adjustments. In CER, we assume 
this strategy when a company reaches a high level of transparency through a comprehens ib le 
and consistent communication of objectives that meet stakeholders’ expectations. 
Strategy 2. A company might try to change a stakeholder’s perception of its ecologica l 
measures when it is not able or willing to make internal adjustments. The strategy does not 
change the expectations of the stakeholders in general, but it affects the way the stakeholders 
perceive the company’s internal adjustments, e.g. when the company states it is in close 
exchange with non-governmental organizations about crucial environmental topics. With 
regard to objectives, this strategy aims at making the stakeholders perceive a company to be 
strongly engaged in future ecological measures.   
Strategy 3. A company tries neither to change stakeholders’ expectations nor to perform 
internal adjustments. It manipulates stakeholders by associating itself with symbols having 
high legitimacy status, e.g. financing an environmental foundation. Thus, the disclosed 
objectives aim rather non-critical and symbolic topics instead of objectives covering actual 
areas of stakeholder concern.  
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Strategy 4. A company is able to decrease the stakeholders’ expectations in general. This 
means expectations are denounced as wrong by informing and educating stakeholders about 
a crucial topic, e.g. that the costs of further investment in pollution reduction are higher than 
those disseminated by the media and that this investment might lead to staff reductions.  
Thus, a company aims to downgrade its stakeholder expectations by for example an 
incomprehensible or confusing communication of objectives (e.g. several changes in relation 
to the or disclosing objectives in all areas that seem to be rather irrelevant for a company’s 
ecological engagement.   
Within their CER, companies may use any of these strategies when reporting their ecologica l 
effort. Following Lindblom (2010), it is also possible that companies might use a combination 
of all four strategies. We summarize our theoretical framework in figure 1. 
   ---------- Insert figure 1 here ---------- 
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Data and methods 
Analytical approach 
In order to gather the relevant data from the environmental reports, we analyzed the reports 
using qualitative content analysis to extract all disclosed objectives. The predefined procedure 
of qualitative content analysis ensures a consistent and comprehensive collection of the data 
(Krippendorff 2004). We sorted the extracted objectives and tracked them through the reports 
until they are either reached or cancelled. Furthermore, we used a cluster analysis to show 
particular pattern in CER of our sample (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984) that allowed for 
further conclusions within our analysis regarding the legitimacy strategies applied.  
Sample 
Our sample includes all available environmental reports published from the years 2000 to the 
year 2014 inclusive from all companies that were listed in the German DAX 30 stock index. 
The cut off date was August 20, 2015. The DAX comprises the 30 largest German companies 
in terms of order book volume and market capitalization. The reasons for choosing this sample 
are described in the following. Management research defines two main internal determinants of 
companies that influence CER: (1) size and (2) industry (Fifka 2013). (1) Studies have shown 
a positive correlation between company size and tendency to disclose environmental reports 
(e.g. Adams et al. 1998; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Hahn and Kühnen 2013; Thorne et al. 2014). 
Thus, targeting an adequate sample, the 30 biggest companies in Germany represents an 
appropriate group. Since German stock companies are subject to certain statutory disclosure 
requirements, we can assume that these companies are experienced in systematic ecologica l 
reporting. Both selection criteria ensure a suitable sample size and a high degree of regular ity 
of reporting, which facilitates the extraction of significant and comparable results. (2) Industry 
affiliation is the second main factor influencing extent and quality of CER (Beresford and 
Feldman 1976; Bowman and Haire 1976; Esrock and Leichty 1998). While we strive for a 
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homogenous sample in terms of company size, we deliberately accept a heterogeneous group 
regarding industry affiliation. This is due to the reason that objectives in CER are still an under-
researched area and we therefore want to obtain data from a variety of industries to reach 
generalizable results (for similar approaches, see Bansal and Roth 2000; Sweeney and 
Coughlan 2008). Since the DAX companies cover a wide range of industries (Hahn and Lülfs 
2014), our findings are broadly applicable.  
In August and September 2015, a total of 260 reports were procured from corporate websites, 
through personal requests or a web search. As not all selected companies disclose in the same 
form, we applied the following inclusion and exclusion criteria to make sure that the reports 
were comparable to each other. First, besides common stand-alone environmental reports, we 
also included integrated reports in our sample. Integrated reports combine annual reports and 
environmental reports and are an approach to link financial and non-financial figures and topics 
(Milne and Gray 2013). To be included in our sample, further requirements of a report were 
that it had to apply to the entire corporate group and that it had to be published in a format that 
cannot be changed subsequently (e.g. printed booklet or PDF document). In accordance with 
the latter restriction, website-only versions of environmental reports were not included in the 
sample as they are not suitable for a longitudinal analysis for two reasons. First, unlike printed 
reports, the disclosing company can subsequently change data on websites. Second, websites, 
especially from the beginning of the observation period, are often no longer available.  
The final sample consists of 25 companies that disclosed 260 environmental reports (see 
Appendix 1 for an overview). Five companies in the DAX were not included in the sample, 
namely Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius, SAP, ThyssenKrupp and Deutsche Börse. The first 
two companies did not provide any detailed environmental reporting that we were able to 
analyze. SAP and ThyssenKrupp report only online on their websites. Deutsche Börse disclosed 
environmental reports that we were able to analyze, but did not issue any objectives.  
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Data collection 
Due to the large quantity of text, a structured approach to gather the data is required. The method 
of qualitative content analysis allows large amounts of content to be codified into various 
categories, and, based on certain criteria, themes or patterns to be identified (Krippendorff 2004; 
Weber 1990). A key criterion for our study is that each coded text passage consists of an actual 
objective. Based on defined characteristics for objectives (discussed in the following 
paragraphs), qualitative content analysis allows this kind of specific data to be collected in a 
replicable and valid way (Krippendorff 2004). Referring to Mayring (2015), we conducted the 
qualitative content analysis as described in the following.  
We developed a codebook that included all ecological dimensions for all company types. The 
categories were derived from the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines Version 4 of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI 2015), as 23 of the 25 companies in our sample use these guidelines 
to ensure accountability (see Appendix 1). Within the section Environmental, the GRI subsumes 
twelve single categories2 that companies should report in. All these categories were included in 
our codebook to achieve a consistent and contemporary approach. Due to the high number of 
coded objectives in the categories Energy, Emissions, Products and Services and Supplier 
Environmental Assessment, we further subdivided each of these into several sub-categories (see 
Appendix 2). Following Nienaber et al. (2015), we added two categories for objectives that are 
not covered by the GRI: Strategic Projects and Monitoring. The category Strategic Projects 
contains objectives in which the companies plan to anchor in the organization a certain strategic 
approach regarding ecological sustainability. The objectives that deal with the control of 
ecological sustainability are subsumed within the category Monitoring.   
                                                                 
 
2 The GRI labels these twelve categories “aspects”, while the aspects are summarized in the “categories” 
Economic, Environmental and Social. However, to achieve a clearer naming system, in this paper we are always 
speaking of categories. Each objective is classified in one category. All categories form the category system. 
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For our analysis, we used three different indicators to reveal the reporting pattern of a company,  
which allowed us to derive conclusions in relation to the applied legitimacy strategy. First, we 
analyzed the level of transparency, which shows whether the company pursued the disclosed 
objectives in a comprehensible and consistent way over time. The figure determines the ratio 
of objectives that were reported transparently instead of not transparently by each company. 
Second, for each company, we counted the number of objectives disclosed in order to see how 
ambitious a company was in its reporting. Third, following the described system of thematic 
categories above, we analyzed the objectives of each company in relation to content, which 
means that we compared their chosen objectives’ topics with common stakeholders’ 
expectations. We categorized stakeholders’ expectations in line with the approach by Reverte 
(2009) and Kilian and Hennings (2014), who differentiate high-, medium- and low-controversy 
industrie in terms of environmental impact. This means, the more controversy a company is, 
the higher are the stakeholders’ expectations towards the company’s CER  
Based on the combination of the three indicators, the study aims at identifying legitimacy 
strategies used by the companies in their disclosed objectives. For the first strategy, it is 
necessary that an objective is reported transparently. Additionally, it should thematically be in 
the focus of stakeholder interest and should demonstrate the motivation of a company to achieve 
an environmental benefit. The second legitimacy strategy is characterized by not transparent 
disclosed objectives in topical areas of stakeholder concern. Due to high stakeholders’ 
expectations, the objectives are too ambitious and thus, hardly achievable. We expect the 
second legitimacy strategy to be applied when a company discloses a number of objectives that 
are reported consistently over several years, but at some point, not mentioned anymore, often 
shortly before due date. The third legitimacy strategy depends primarily on the number of 
disclosed objectives targeting sensitive topics of high stakeholder interest. The fewer objectives 
of sensitive topics are disclosed, the higher is the likelihood of the presence of legitimacy 
strategy three. Finally, the fourth legitimacy strategy is characterized by a reporting pattern that 
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aims at a downward influence of stakeholders’ expectations, which can be identified by low 
levels of transparency and content-related irrelevance.  
Data analysis 
For our coding we used the data analysis software MAXQDA. In order to ensure a high quality 
in our approach, we applied several coding rules: First, in line with Nienaber et al. (2015) and 
Schewe et al. (2012), we coded only those statements concerning ecological intentions that can 
be clearly identified as objectives. This means a company explicitly reports which result is 
supposed to be achieved on which basis at a certain time in the future. Therefore, the elements 
subject, extent and time period of a statement have to be coded. If one of these three elements 
was not available, we classified those kinds of statements as “intention”, and did not include 
them in our analysis. An example of a clear target can be seen in the case of E.ON, which stated 
in one of its reports that the company wanted to achieve a decrease of its carbon dioxide 
emissions (subject) by 50% (extent) between 1990 and 2030 (time period) which belongs to the 
GRI category: CVB .A second coding rule is that we did not code objectives that refer to a 
specific division of the company or a particular region. These objectives do not ensure a proper 
comparison of the companies in our sample. Third, we included only those objectives that 
applied for a period of more than two years. That means we excluded those targets that applied  
for a very short period, since we are interested to see whether companies report transparently 
over several years (longitudinal approach).  
In order to assess the level of transparency of CER over the 15-year period, we applied a 
procedure that allowed us to identify inconsistency in reporting objectives over time. This aim 
prohibits the use of a simple scoring model as applied in previous studies (e.g. Aerts and 
Cormier 2009; Al‐Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Cormier and Magnan 2003; Wiseman 1982). Kolk 
(2004) showed that a profound assessment of transparency has to go beyond the statements 
reported or not reported in respect of certain dimensions regarding sustainability. We therefore 
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proposed a more complex method of analysis that did not assess the objectives per year but 
rather over a period of time. An objective that was mentioned for the first time in an 
environmental report was evaluated by its indication in following reports. This means that we 
classified the reporting of an objective as transparent when the objective was pursued over the 
next several years until it was attained without a negative change of subject, extent, or time 
period. It is important to note that this approach does not intend that all objectives claimed to 
be transparent had to be achieved. Changes of subject, extent, or time period were allowed as 
long as this was explained transparently in the relevant report. Furthermore, we want to 
emphasize that our evaluation of transparency and applied legitimacy strategy of a company is 
always a relative indication in comparison to the other companies in the sample. 
The analysis was done by two separate coders (research assistants). The first research assistant 
coded 20% of the reports. Based on this initial coding, the code book was modified in 
coordination with the second research assistant (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The first research 
assistant then coded all reports. A memo containing operational definitions, coding rules and 
sample report quotes was written for each category. The second research assistant 
independently coded 20% of the overall data. The percentage agreement between the two coders 
reached a satisfactory level of 78.1%.  
Cluster analysis 
A cluster analysis identifies relatively homogeneous groups based on particular characterist ic s 
of the objects (Hair et al. 1998). The clusters show similarities within a group, and divergences 
between the groups (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984). For our analysis of disclosed objectives, 
it was important to work out the commonalities and disparities among and between the 
companies in our sample. As described above, we use three indicators that help to identify 
particular legitimacy strategies of the companies within the sample. Because only two of the 
three indicators are quantifiable (level of transparency and number of disclosed objectives), we 
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use these two indicators in the cluster analysis. This approach allows for a reduction of 
complexity since the companies in the clusters have similar characteristics. The analysis of the 
objectives with regard to their thematic focus (third indicator) support the identification of 
legitimacy strategies on both company and cluster level. Thus, the combination of all three 
indicators were the basis for our assumptions in regard to the application of a particular 
legitimacy strategy. We describe the precise procedure of our cluster analysis in the following.  
First, we checked for potential outliers by assessing the levels of (dis)similarities by means of 
the squared Euclidean distance. We applied Ward’s method, one of the most common methods 
when applying cluster analysis (Dolnicar 2003; Du et al. 2015). The method belongs to the 
hierarchical approaches group of analysis and aims at minimizing the variance within a cluster 
(Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Ward 1963). Because both our indicators, level of 
transparency and number of objectives disclosed, had different scales and means, we 
standardized to z scores. We identified four clusters by checking typical criteria such as the 
coefficient of error, sums of squares and the dendrogram. These clusters showed a satisfactory 
internal homogeneity and good distance values between each other (see Appendix 3). Four 
groups result from our cluster analysis. Figure 2 shows all companies in line with (a) the total 
number of objectives disclosed by each company (x-coordinate) and (b) the share of objectives 
that are reported transparently instead of not transparently (y-coordinate) – the subjects of the 
different objectives are shown due to complexity and a better structure separately in each 
cluster.  
---------- Insert figure 2 here ---------- 
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In the following, we show our findings in regards to the applied legitimacy strategy for each 
group of companies to reduce complexity when analyzing all 25 companies over the time span 
of 15 years. For this main analysis we have to take all three indicators into account since 
otherwise we are not able to identify specific pattern in CER that lead towards a particular 
legitimacy strategy the companies in a group seem to apply.  
Findings 
Cluster 1 - Signaling 
Overall, the 25 companies in our sample disclose 284 objectives, which is an average of 11.4 
objectives per company. Of all objectives, 69.4% are reported transparently. The first group (in 
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the top left corner of figure 2) is characterized by a relatively low number of total objectives 
(fewer than ten) and a high level of transparency of more than 85%. Therefore, we call this 
group Signaler. This group includes six companies: Allianz, Infineon, Lanxess, Linde, Merck 
and Munich Re (see Table 1). It is the most homogenous group regarding the number of 
objectives and the level of transparency in regards to their CER. The objectives’ topics in regard 
to the categories mentioned in the GRI seem to be focused on those with great relevance for 
stakeholders nowadays, e.g. Energy (Energy Consumption and Use of Energy from Renewable 
Sources) or Greenhouse Gas Emissions (United Nations 1997). Thus, these topics can all be 
rated as highly relevant.  
 
Based on these reporting patterns, the question is what strategy does this group apply in their 
CER? First of all, it seems that the companies want to demonstrate quality for quantity—which 
means firstly, they report about topics that are highly relevant for their stakeholders, and 
secondly, disclose rather few objectives but want to follow up on those disclosed objectives. In 
relation to the first point, we see that each of the six companies discloses at least one objective 
in the categories Energy Consumption and/or Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Although the 
particular level of expectations of the stakeholders for the different companies in cluster one 
differ (high, medium and low), we can see that the companies in this group disclose objectives 
23 
 
in topical areas of large stakeholder concern.  Topics in those two fields are very important in 
general to all stakeholders and therefore companies should fulfill stakeholders’ expectations in 
these areas.  With regard to the second point, chemical and pharmaceutical company Merck 
gives a good example for the transparent reporting approach. In the year 2002, Merck discloses 
the objective to increase the recycling rate of waste to 57% by 2010. The company pursues this 
objective transparently and is able to report its success in the year 2010, even overachieving by 
5%. Thus, the general level of transparency in CER is relatively high in this cluster. Altogether, 
these findings lead to the assumption that the companies in this group predominantly try to 
apply the first of Lindblom’s legitimacy strategies. The companies disclose well-chosen 
objectives that they are able to internally adjust and, thus, fulfill stakeholders’ expectations. 
Hence, based on the idea of stakeholder theory, this group is an example of transparent CER 
towards its stakeholders. The consistency within the objectives demonstrates further that these 
companies do not want to manipulate their stakeholders but rather to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness and their right to exist. 
Cluster 2 - Greenwashers  
A second group (top right corner), labeled Greenwasher, comprises companies with a relative ly 
high number of published objectives compared to the other groups (minimum of 14) and a share 
of transparently to not transparently reported objectives greater than 55%. It is the biggest 
group, with nine companies, namely Adidas, BASF, Bayer, BMW, Daimler, E.ON, 
HeidelbergCement, Siemens and Volkswagen. 
The group Greenwasher is the largest group in our sample, containing nine companies (36% of 
the whole sample). These nine companies release a total of 170 objectives (more than 60% of 
all objectives in our sample). On average, each company in this cluster reports 18.9 objectives 
(seven more than the sample average). The highest number of objectives is published between 
the years XC in periods two (69 new objectives) and tX hree (80 new objectives) (see appendix 
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figure 1). A clear advise that these companies seem to apply greenwashing is that, despite the 
increased number of objectives, the companies are able to enhance their level of transparency 
in both periods. In period two 70% of objectives are reported transparently; and 89% in period 
three. With an overall group transparency level of 79%, the Greenwashers report at least on the 
second-highest level of transparency of all groups. Thus, we assume that this companies are 
aware of the fact that CER is important but try to cover their sometimes less ambitious behavior 
in regards to environmental issues. Another fact that we identified considering the companies 
of this group is that the Greenwashers do not focus on the critical topics in their CER. Instead, 
we can see that the group covers the full list of GRI categories. This finding underlines our 
assumptions that this groups tries to confuse their stakeholders with a hugh amount of objectives 
but with not all being in the critical areas of environmental challenges. This assumption 
becomes even more evidence when we take the particular topics into account the companies 
report about. Besides a number of objectives in the highly topical categories Emissions 
(Greenhouse Gas Emissions as well as Other Significant Air Emissions) and Energy 
Consumption, all but two companies (Daimler, HeidelbergCement) in this group also report in 
the category Water, a topic having rather little stakeholder attention. 
Within this group, BMW seems to be a good example to demonstrate the group’s CER, since 
BMW meets the absolute average (19 objectives; 79% transparency level, and topics that cover 
the full range of the GRI categories). In most cases, BMW is transparent in the ways objectives 
are reported to stakeholders. For example, the objective to reduce waste water by 30% (based 
on 2006) is disclosed in 2008 and fulfilled in 2012. Subsequently, BMW publishes a follow-up 
objective, this time a reduction of 45% waste water (based on 2006) by 2020, which is reported 
transparently until the cut-off date for this study. In contrast to BMW, Bayer and E.ON occupy 
respectively the upper and lower levels in regard to transparency level in this group but target 
all the whole range of GRI categories. Reaching a level of transparency of over 90%, Bayer is 
on the same level as the companies in the group Transparent. However, Bayer discloses 26 
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objectives—a considerable number—over all three periods and thus is much more ambitious 
compared to the companies in the group Transparent. E.ON discloses 18 objectives, but the 
transparency level of 56% is rather low (group average 79%). A total of eight objectives are 
evaluated as not being transparently reported over the time period. Detailed analysis of the 
individual objectives reveals that each of the eight goals lacking transparency is directly or 
indirectly associated with climate protection. This topic is of special relevance for E.ON as an 
electric utilities company, because the company’s power plants emit large amounts of carbon 
dioxide. As the public’s attention to climate change increases over the observation period, the 
company needs to report carefully. One example demonstrates relatively well E.ON’s typical 
reporting pattern. In 2005, the company claims it would invest five billion euro in renewable 
energy by 2015. Although E.ON tracks this objective in the following years, the reporting stops 
in 2009 and 2010 without further explanation. In 2011, the objective is resumed with a due date 
of 2016 and a total investment of now seven billion euro. The same objective is changed again 
in 2013 without any comment to a yearly investment sum of 1.3 billion euro in 2014. 
Based on these findings, we have to draw a rather complex picture in terms of this group’s 
strategy in CER. As all companies publish a very high number of disclosed objectives and a 
relatively high percent of transparency, it seems in the beginning that most companies apply 
legitimacy strategy one, but when we have a closer look at the topics the companies target with 
their disclosed objectives, we have to change our first impression. Firstly, all companies target 
the whole range of GRI categories when analyzing their disclosed objectives. That means CER 
includes objectives of low, medium and high relevance for stakeholders. These hugh amount 
of objectives may confuse the stakeholders since he is not able to identify the really important 
ones any more due to the mass. Secondly, we are able to see tendencies towards the fact that 
this groups meats their stakeholders’ expectations in particular with objectives that are not that 
critical and thus, relatively easy to achieve. The disclosed objectives in the really critical topics 
are often times not fulfilled. However, due to the amount of disclosed objectives these 
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objectives do not have such a big influence on the level of transparency in general. Thus, the 
companies look in the first instance relatively transparent but not at the second glance. E.ON, 
for example, discloses a number of objectives that highlight renewable energy projects, whereas 
no objective is reported regarding nuclear power, although it is one of E.ON’s key sources of 
energy. This allows us to assume that the third legitimacy strategy might be applied. This kind 
of strategy uses reporting to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions by talking about noncritica l 
topics. This impression is underlined by another fact. Against the background of climate change 
and the nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, stakeholders’ expectations have strongly changed for 
electric utilities within the period under review. We assume that E.ON is on the one hand not 
able to fulfill its stakeholders’ expectations (which can be seen by a low transparency level) 
and thus tries to change stakeholders’ perceptions by applying the second legitimacy strategy. 
However, other examples, in this group may soften this impression. Bayer’s disclosed 
objectives show only small failures, and those made seem coincidental rather than purposeful. 
Therefore, we assume negligent reporting instead of a manipulative strategy and thus, 
legitimacy strategy two has to be considered. Therefore, the companies in this cluster apply two 
of Lindblom’s legitimacy strategies, namely strategy two and three.  
Cluster 3 - Unconcerned  
The companies in the third group (middle left area) labeled Unconcerned, show a simila r ly 
small number of disclosed objectives as the Signaler group. But in contrast to the Signaler 
group, these companies are characterized by a considerably lower level of transparency (40-
70%). Seven companies form this group: Beiersdorf, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche 
Post, Henkel, K+S, and Lufthansa. 
The third group consists of seven companies that are characterized by a relatively low number 
of objectives (6.7 on average), a below-average level of transparency (60%), and a confusing 
picture in relation to the topics in CER compared to the rest of the sample. Due to the relative l 
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vague picture and no particular tendency towards the number, topic or level or transparency in 
their disclosed objective, we all this group the Unconcerned.  Obviously this group has not yet 
recognized how important a transparent CER might be for stakeholders. However, it is also 
important to point out that the low numbers of disclosed objectives are not steady over time. 
The group shows a strong increase from a 0% level of transparency in the first period to 68% 
and 73% in periods two and three respectively. Also the number of objectives rise noticeably. 
Considering the topics this group covers, we see that all companies but one disclose at least one 
objective regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions, which is in line with the findings in the other 
three clusters. Besides, it is noteworthy that Lufthansa discloses five of its eight objectives in 
the category Responsibility for Products and Services. Thus, we can assume that this group may 
become more concerned towards the importance of a consistent CER, but that they are still in 
the beginning phase of realizing this.   
Our analysis of the objectives for the group Unconcerend reveals a number of examples in 
which companies in the group frequently fail to pursue clear objectives in relevant topics 
consistently over time. One example is the chemical company K+S, which, in the their 
environmental report of 2008, announces an aspiration to increase investments in water 
protection by up to 360 million euro in order to halve the amount of salt water in the production 
process by 2015. The company reports this objective transparently until 2012. After 2012 the 
objective is not pursued any more, and without any further explanation. Additionally, water 
protection is considered as important on a low level by their stakeholders and thus, not of great 
relevance anyway. Another example relates to the logistics company Deutsche Post. In its 2008 
report the company announces it would replace 90% of its own air fleet with more economical 
models by 2020. However, the objective is not tracked in the following report. In 2010, the 
company follows up on the objective but with changed numbers. Their new target is to replace 
more than 15% (reference year 2009) of the air fleet by 2015.  
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The overall evaluation of this cluster regarding its use of legitimacy strategies is rather difficult 
and shows a fuzzy picture. The companies reveal a below-average level of transparency, and 
targeting topics with their disclosed objectives that do not show any pattern and are not of high 
relevance for their stakeholders. Although, we can identify a positive trends towards the number 
and transparency level of their disclosed objectives, the topics choice has not become better. 
However, objectives are still often cancelled or changed without notification. This is 
particularly noteworthy as the number of objectives is comparatively low. It appears that the 
industry of which the companies in this cluster are members plays a decisive role. For the two 
companies in each of the banking (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank) and consumer goods 
(Beiersdorf, Henkel) industries, we see relatively low stakeholders’ expectations due to a rather 
small environmental impact (see Appendix 4). However, the companies do not reach a high 
level of transparency because of negligence in the reporting of the objectives. Furthermore,  for 
a few objectives we find signs that stakeholders are consciously mislead (legit imacy strategy 
two). Stronger indications for the second legitimacy strategy are apparent for the logist ics 
company Deutsche Post and the chemical company K+S. We can see in these examples that 
both companies disclose objectives in topic areas that are strongly marked by high stakeholders’ 
expectations. Stakeholders expect Deutsche Post to reduce emissions relating to its logist ics 
operation, which the company tries to meet by disclosing the objective described above. The 
way this objective is communicated (ambitious outcome, cancelled without notification after 
one year) is a clear indication of the use of legitimacy strategy two, meaning that the company 
discloses an objective according to stakeholders’ expectations without sufficient interna l 
adjustments. K+S is confronted with high stakeholder pressure (see Appendix 4), which stems 
mainly from local residents due to the pollution of adjacent rivers. Their objective to invest in 
water pollution control is cancelled without notification close to the due date. This reporting 
pattern also suggests a strategy aiming at misleading stakeholders by changing their perception 
of the actual internal adjustment (legitimacy strategy two). In sum, the companies in cluster 
29 
 
three show a rather fuzzy picture in their reporting. We find indications for negligent reporting 
of objectives that does not follow any strategy. In addition, we identify some companies that 
use the second legitimacy strategy to change stakeholders’ perception of the company’s interna l 
adjustment.  
Cluster 4 – Incapable 
Lastly, the three companies remaining are characterized by a level of transparency of less than 
30% (bottom of figure 1). Due to the low level of transparency, we call this group Incapable. 
Its members are Continental, Deutsche Telekom and RWE. Each of these companies disclose 
between ten and 14 objectives. 
The last group is called Incapable because a very low level of transparency (less than 30%) and 
no pattern at all in their chosen topics they communicate. All three companies in this group are 
characterized by this messy picture. RWE, Continental and Deutsche Telekom publish ten 
objectives on average and achieve a group transparency level of only 20% in topics that are 
sometimes of high relevance for their stakeholders such as Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
sometimes of very low relevance, e.g. Waste. Furthermore, we can see that although the 
companies disclose a considerably lower number of objectives in the third period (six 
objectives) compared to period two (17 objectives), the transparency level of reporting 
decreases from 29% to 17% in the respective periods. Looking at the topics the three companies 
in the cluster target, we can highlight the categories Greenhouse Gas Emissions (five objectives 
by RWE) and Energy Consumption. A high number of objectives are also disclosed in the 
category Waste (Continental: 4; Deutsche Telekom: 3). 
The companies within the Incapable group produce many examples of insufficient ly 
transparent reporting in different topics. In 2007, RWE, the second electric utilities company in 
our sample, discloses it would expand the installed power of renewable energies by (1) 4.5 
gigawatts by 2012 and (2) up to 10 gigawatts by 2020. The latter objective is tracked only until 
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2009. Afterwards, there was no follow up at all. For the first objective, in 2010 RWE extends 
the targeted time period to the year 2014 without any comment. In 2013, the objective is 
adjusted again but this time in relation to its extent: in particular, the level of installed power of 
renewable energies is changed from 4.5 to 4.3 gigawatts. This kind of reporting allows us to 
assume that RWE, like E.ON, is faced with changing stakeholders’ expectations due to external 
challenges that threatened the business model, mainly from climate change and the nuclear 
phaseout in Germany. Furthermore, we are also able to identify another pattern of CER. RWE 
does not disclose a single objective that related to the topic of nuclear energy, whereas 
renewable energy projects are highlighted several times (three objectives). Additionally, we 
identify a company that does not pursue a single objective transparently: automotive supplier 
Continental. A first wave of four objectives is disclosed within the annual report of 2007, 
namely a 5% reduction of each of energy consumption, water consumption, carbon dioxide 
emissions and waste volume by 2012. While Continental pursues these objectives in the 
following report, they pay no attention to them in the years 2009 and 2010. In the reports from 
2011 onwards, Continental revives these objectives, but repeatedly changes the extent and time 
period.  
Based on the analysis of the reporting pattern, we can draw different conclusions regarding the 
use of legitimacy strategies in this cluster. Again, the industry field plays a decisive role when 
disclosing objectives because of the topic that is of relevance for the company’s stakeholder.  
As a telecommunication company, Deutsche Telekom has to expect comparatively low 
stakeholders’ expectations regarding environmental issues (see Appendix 4). They disclose a 
number of achievable objectives, which they appear to report relatively carelessly. All topics 
are of little interest for their stakeholders and thus, the whole reports seem to be rather a shield 
to avoid any higher stakeholder expectations. Showcasing the achievement of objectives but in 
an industry field that maybe is not that decisive for the environmental wellbeing or in topics 
that are not of high relevance for the stakeholders, just want to achieve low stakeholders’ 
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expectations or maybe even downgrade stakeholders’ expectations. Downgrading because on 
the one hand Telecom demonstrates that its industry is not really able to do something to save 
the environment in general and on the other hand demonstrates with achieving their objectives 
in rather less important fields their positive engagement. Both leads to lower stakeholder 
expectations for the future for this company’s ecological engagement. And thus, let us assume 
that this group applies legitimacy strategy four.  
 
This leads to a nontransparent CER, but seems not to follow any of Lindblom’s legitimacy 
strategies. Automotive supplier Continental discloses the objectives of achieving reductions in 
four areas by five per cent. The fact that the these are general objectives of always 5%, which 
are disclosed in very different topical areas, might be an indication towards the use of the second 
legitimacy strategy, especially when considering that Continental faces increased stakeholders’ 
expectations (see Appendix 4). However, the objectives are communicated in a very confusing 
manner, so that we do not assume the use of an actual strategy here. For RWE our results point 
to the use of the second legitimacy strategy. The company is confronted with relative ly 
ambitious stakeholders’ expectations. Although the second legitimacy strategy seems to be the 
focus of RWE, our results also indicate tendencies towards the use of the third legitimacy 
strategy. This becomes obvious because RWE discloses a number of objectives regarding 
renewable energies, but none concerning nuclear power. Overall, we can identify the tendencies 
of RWE to use the second and third legitimacy strategy, whereas Deutsche Telekom and 
Continental show no use of strategy at all. 
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Discussion 
Legitimacy strategies 
The reporting pattern we analyze in our study evinces the way in which companies disclose 
objectives in their CER and allows for further conclusions regarding the legitimacy strategies  
applied. In the following, we discuss to what extent these strategies are used by the companies 
in our sample. 
In the last years, several studies have shown that companies nowadays are aware of the 
importance of a transparent reporting (e.g. Scherer et al. 2013; Smith 2003; Waddock et al. 
2002). Furthermore, a great number of companies worldwide (e.g. BP in conjunction with its 
oil disaster) were seriously affected by the discovery of “greenwashing” (Cherry and Sneirson 
2011), means misleading stakeholders in relation to their ecological activities that they 
promised in their CER. A mismatch between the disclosed objectives and the actual interna l 
adjustments that has not been transparently communicated leads to distempered stakeholders 
(Du et al. 2010). In contrast, following stakeholder theory, companies that are perceived to 
fulfill stakeholders’ expectations benefit, for example, through access to capital at lower costs 
(Orlitzky 2008) or an advantage in attracting and retaining employees (Greening and Turban 
2000). Thus, in line with legitimacy theory, we expected to identify in most cases Lindblom’s 
first legitimacy strategy. However, our results suggest that companies seem to have different 
demands on their own reporting quality in terms of disclosed objectives. Only the companies 
in the group Transparent, and a few companies from the Ambitious group, are able to disclose 
and pursue relevant objectives that reach high transparency levels over time, and thus 
successfully apply the first legitimacy strategy. 
Instead, we are able to demonstrate that within our sample, the companies apply the second 
legitimacy strategy lots of times and thus try that their activities are recognized as conform to 
their stakeholders’ value system (legitimacy theory). The companies in the clusters Ambitious 
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and Underperformer are main users of this strategy. For both groups, we identify companies 
that show a tendency to disclose ambitious objectives that are not really achievable, mainly 
because the objectives’ achievement is highly dependent from external factors, such as the lega l 
situation. In all these cases, we expect that high stakeholder pressure might be a main reason 
for trying to change the perception of the stakeholder in terms of the companies’ own interna l 
adjustments. An indication for the application of this strategy can be found when companies 
disclose several objectives that are reported consistently over time, but unexpectedly cancelled 
without notification. Considering that we identify the second legitimacy strategy frequently 
within our data, we assume that objectives are a common tool in CER to change stakeholders’ 
perceptions in terms of the internal adjustments that are actually made.  
However, it is important to note that the second legitimacy strategy is relatively complicated to 
identify. On the one hand, a failure in the transparent communication of objectives does not 
necessarily indicate an intent to mislead stakeholders. Often, we assume a negligent 
communication of objectives rather than the deployment of a conscious strategy. On the other 
hand, a company might communicate objectives transparently, but without making actual 
internal adjustments. However, we cannot prove in our analysis if a company lies to its 
stakeholders in such a way. 
Occasionally, we can find hints of the third legitimacy strategy. This strategy highlights non-
critical topics instead of subjects from areas of concern. Both electric utilities companies, E.ON 
and RWE, disclose above-average numbers of objectives, but not one objective related to 
nuclear energy, which is a topic of the highest public interest. Instead, both companies report 
intensively about their renewable energies (E.ON: four objectives; RWE: three objectives). 
Without any question, this is also a topic of great interest—but it is also a symbol for clean and 
future-oriented technology and therefore has a high legitimate status, which makes it a preferred 
topic for a company to talk about.  
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Apart from the different legitimacy strategies we reveal in our analysis, our results show an 
alarming tendency of some companies in the sample that seem not to follow any legitimacy 
strategy at all. We rather find a negligent communication of objectives, which is characterized 
by a number of objectives that are not only communicated non-transparent over time, but rather 
in such a confusing manner that we cannot assume an actual attempt to mislead stakeholder  
(e.g. Continental). If a company changes the extent of an objective in every report without 
notification, even a stakeholder who compares only two or three consecutive reports can 
identify a non-transparent communication. Taking the findings of stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory into account, this reporting behavior is unwise because it may have a direct 
impact on a company’s legitimacy. 
Overall, our findings indicate that the companies in our sample use all three legitimacy 
strategies that we derived from Lindblom (2010) within our theoretical framework. It is 
important to note that only few companies pursue a continuous strategy of disclosing objectives 
matching the actual internal adjustments (first legitimacy strategy). More often, the companies 
use the second legitimacy strategy. However, we want to emphasize that these companies at 
least have a strategic approach in regard to disclosing objectives in CER. For some companies, 
we are not able to recognize any strategy at all.  
The results described raise the question why companies have a certain reporting behavior. 
External pressure can force companies to disclose more objectives (or objectives with higher 
extents or shorter time periods) than they wish to. Therefore, companies may be in the situation 
of having to disclose objectives while knowing well that the required internal adjustments 
cannot be achieved. If this is the case, a company has two options. First, the company can follow 
up on the objective until the end of the time period and then report openly that it failed to 
achieve this objective. Second, companies can either stop reporting information about the 
objective or change the extent or time period of the objective without further explanation. In 
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our analysis we identify several cases that take the latter option, whereas the first option could 
be found only a very few times. Because the costs of a confession (in the literature also called 
proprietary costs, e.g. Prencipe 2004, Verrecchia 1983) in line with option one can be relative ly 
high, we are not surprised to find this small number of examples. In contrast, the second option 
is applied far more often, since costs would only arise when the non-transparent reporting is 
revealed by stakeholders. Obviously, on most occasions stakeholders do not notice these non-
transparent reporting, since we are able to show changes in extent and time period regularly for 
the companies in our sample. This strategy leads to minimum cost for the company, which 
companies aim at in environmental reporting (Cormier and Magnan 1999; Gamerschlag et al. 
2011). Therefore, we wish to encourage stakeholders and researchers to check for consistency 
when trying to identify whether a company claims to be an ecologically sustainable company 
or not.  
Managerial implications 
We are able to derive three managerial implications. First, it is important for a manager to have 
a clear understanding of how to handle objectives in a company’s CER. That means it is the 
best way to disclose only those objectives that can be realistically achieved. This allows 
companies to reach a relatively high level of transparency in reporting over time and thus helps 
to maintain legitimacy (following legitimacy strategy one). In contrast, it is very important to 
avoid a negligent communication of objectives. Even though a company might actually be able 
to make sufficient internal adjustments, this kind of communication gives stakeholders the 
impression that the company does not take its statements about future intentions serious (Du et 
al. 2010). Although objectives that are very ambitious may pretend—potentially over several 
years—a relatively high ecological engagement of a company, we do not recommend to disclose 
too ambitious objectives. This is due to the reason that a company will probably not achieve 
these objectives and therefore has to decide between two choices: (a) do not communicate the 
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failure transparently or (b) communicate the failure transparently. While (a) is definitive ly 
misleading stakeholders, we also think that (b) is ethically not correct because the objective was 
disclosed knowing that an achievement is unlikely, and the stakeholders are misled over several 
reporting periods. In contrast, the failure will be announced in just one report, hoping that a 
great percentage of stakeholder will be unaware of it. Furthermore, in both cases the costs of 
(a) an exposure of the non-transparency and (b) an own confession of the failure (especially for 
a company’s legitimacy) are extremely unpredictable. Overall, a high level of transparency in 
the disclosed objectives becomes even more important since we expect that companies’ 
disclosed objectives in CER will be monitored more closely in the future. Thus, a company is 
well-advised to apply the first legitimacy strategy, and, in case of high stakeholders’ 
expectations, communicate clearly why the circumstances do not allow to disclose objectives, 
e.g. because of unpredictable external factors. 
Second, we recommend publishing overview tables for objectives to those managers who have 
to deal with the design and development of environmental reports. These tables contain all 
recent objectives, divided by thematic categories, and include extent and end time. Changes in 
objectives as well as new objectives should be indicated clearly and explained briefly. Measures 
adopted and status updates on progress are not necessary but add interesting information. These 
tables make it easy for stakeholders to gain an overview of objectives in reports. As we 
identified, clearly structured overview tables are a first indication of transparent reporting. 
Merck, which has used overview tables in its reports since 2005, is a positive example of a 
company taking this approach. Only one of Merck’s nine objectives is not reported 
transparently. Thus, we recommend companies to demonstrate their high level of transparency 
when disclosing objectives by providing tables that stakeholder can easily follow. 
Third, we suggest managers consider the industry their company operates in when disclosing 
objectives. Our results show the number of objectives disclosed varies greatly between the 
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companies in our four groups, which indicates that no standard exists that recommends how 
many objectives should be disclosed. Despite the rather small number of companies in our 
sample, our findings indicate that the number of disclosed objectives might be related to the 
industry in which a company operates. Research has already shown that different sectors 
influence the quality and extent of environmental reporting (Hahn and Kühnen 2013). Our 
results partially correspond to those findings, as the Ambitious group (characterized by a rather 
large number of disclosed objectives and a rather high level of transparency) contains only 
companies from sectors whose operations have environmental impacts, e.g. the automotive 
industry (BMW, Daimler, Volkswagen), the chemical industry (BASF, Bayer) or the operations 
of an electric utilities company (E.ON) (see Appendix 4). Companies from sectors that are less 
closely related to environmental impacts, such as the financial service sector (in the insurance 
field, such as Munich Re and Linde, or the banking field, such as Commerzbank and Deutsche 
Bank) disclose fewer objectives. However, exceptions can be found. Lufthansa (aviation 
industry; 8 objectives) and K+S (chemical industry; 10 objectives) do have a direct 
environmental impact but disclose a below-average number of objectives. Based on these 
results, we suggest companies from sectors with high environmental impact should disclose a 
higher number of objectives compared to those companies from low-impact industries. This is 
important to comply with stakeholders’ expectations. For the actual number of objectives that 
are expected, the companies can take account of our study’s results. 
Limitations and future research  
Some limitations must be mentioned: First, due to the longitudinal design of our analysis, we 
have to state that the transparency level of reporting objectives in the last period might, in 
general, be positively skewed compared to the first and second period. While the first period 
can be evaluated over a rather long time horizon, objectives first disclosed in the last period are 
usually not completed within our sample. Further studies are needed to follow up on our 
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analyzed objectives and to compare the results with our results, in particular in time period three 
(2010-2014). 
Second, we did not consider environmental reports on websites due to the ability for them to be 
changed over time. Although it seems likely that website reports will be given increasing 
attention in the future, and thus, potentially more stakeholders will read them, we believe that 
the backward modifiability of the data supports non-transparency. Nevertheless, when 
companies stop publishing reports in PDF format, future research will have to consider the use 
of online CER. Periodic screenshots of the reporting websites might be a feasible solution for 
the problems mentioned above.  
Third, our study considered the largest stock-listed companies in Germany, which is a rather 
small sample. However, all of these companies have embedded sustainability management as 
part of their strategy and therefore frequently issued environmental reports. Therefore, future 
research should also try to analyze the reporting strategies of small- and medium-s ize 
companies, which may not have embedded sustainability management, and compare our 
findings with other international samples. Furthermore, in order to reach generalizable results 
in an under-researched field, we did not focus on a particular industry. Further studies on 
specific industries can provide valuable insights through the comparison of companies in 
different industries. 
Fourth, it is important to state that our results are based on environmental reports only and thus 
do not give any information regarding the actual and concrete ecological activities of a 
company. Thus, if a company aims at lying to its stakeholders (instead of misleading them), we 
cannot prove this in our analysis. In fact, our evaluation of a company’s transparency is an 
assessment of its reporting consistency over time as well as a relative indication in comparison 
to the other companies of the sample.  
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Lastly, our research design does not consider how companies address different stakeholders 
when disclosing objectives in their CER. Stakeholder theory suggests a long-term involvement 
of stakeholders to obtain a competitive advantage (e.g. Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 2014; Morsing 
and Schultz 2006). Future research in this field should consider this fact and answer the question 
as to what extent transparency in CER is necessary for the various stakeholder relationships. 
Conclusion 
This study addresses the increasingly discussed topic of transparency in CER. Based on 
institutional, legitimacy and stakeholder theory and the legitimacy strategies suggested by 
Lindblom (2010), our work contributes to existing research in two respects.  
First, we use the established legitimacy strategies to apply them to a particular element of CER, 
namely the disclosed objectives, which helps to further understand ing of strategies in CER. 
Second, we show that these legitimacy strategies can be identified through a comprehens ive 
analysis of the objectives’ reporting pattern in terms of transparency. This allows for an 
empirical validation of Lindblom's theoretical model of legitimacy strategies. 
Based on our results, we assign each company to one of the groups Transparent, Ambitious, 
Underperformer and Nontransparent. While the Transparent group shows a strategy of actual 
internal adjustments that follow on disclosed objectives, we can see a tendency of certain 
companies within the groups Ambitious and Underperformer to use misleading strategies that 
are intended to change the stakeholders’ perception regarding the companies’ interna l 
adjustments. In contrast, we cannot identify clear strategies of the companies in the group 
Nontransparent. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Sample 
 
Note: ER = Environmental Report; IR = Integrated Report; The years refer to the publication date of the reports given by the companies. Where a 
report encompasses longer reporting periods than the year of the publication date, we marked the prior years by an arrow. For example, the Allianz 
environmental report of the year 2004 includes the reporting periods for 2003 and 2004.  
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Appendix 2: Category system 
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Appendix 3: Distance Table 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1:Adidas 0.000
2:BASF .119 0.000
3:Bayer 2.135 1.381 0.000
4:BMW .502 .161 1.297 0.000
5:Daimler .969 .420 .900 .096 0.000
6:Siemens .411 .492 3.337 .533 1.053 0.000
7:Volkswagen .221 .168 2.305 .199 .569 .095 0.000
8:E.ON 2.149 1.572 3.275 .795 .794 1.091 1.019 0.000
9:HeidelbergCement 2.050 1.243 1.504 .524 .244 1.680 1.206 .433 0.000
10:Lanxess 1.420 2.135 6.940 2.683 3.784 .880 1.420 3.576 4.984 0.000
11:Merck 1.078 1.727 6.178 2.272 3.298 .684 1.127 3.299 4.505 .024 0.000
12:Allianz 2.187 3.245 8.611 4.230 5.599 2.014 2.629 5.865 7.328 .306 .367 0.000
13:Infineon 4.852 6.336 13.408 7.534 9.330 4.253 5.294 8.956 11.272 1.266 1.539 .533 0.000
14:Linde 3.125 4.353 10.402 5.424 6.963 2.782 3.567 6.973 8.778 .562 .708 .085 .192 0.000
15:Munich Re 4.234 5.632 12.363 6.788 8.498 3.720 4.676 8.252 10.398 .989 1.219 .341 .021 .085 0.000
16:Henkel 1.565 1.869 6.162 1.840 2.634 .445 .947 1.660 3.127 .519 .526 1.614 3.000 2.041 2.638 0.000
17:K+S 2.379 2.545 6.934 2.235 2.950 .829 1.406 1.392 3.089 1.155 1.202 2.605 3.990 3.031 3.628 .141 0.000
18:Lufthansa 4.072 4.272 9.440 3.765 4.573 1.922 2.746 2.176 4.442 1.990 2.161 3.622 4.582 3.878 4.304 .651 .227 0.000
19:Beiersdorf 2.432 3.011 8.313 3.150 4.211 1.117 1.863 2.936 4.883 .387 .517 1.176 1.922 1.347 1.688 .195 .377 .671 0.000
20:Commerzbank 6.667 6.984 13.273 6.325 7.311 3.832 4.987 3.945 6.952 3.384 3.723 5.114 5.434 5.114 5.285 1.806 1.099 .333 1.483 0.000
21:Deutsche Bank 6.886 7.597 14.812 7.347 8.667 4.225 5.560 5.501 8.791 2.757 3.184 3.878 3.558 3.622 3.537 1.930 1.506 .767 1.183 .333 0.000
22:Deutsche Post 4.191 4.784 10.878 4.686 5.829 2.215 3.218 3.631 6.180 1.262 1.522 2.285 2.605 2.285 2.455 .674 .533 .333 .270 .566 .333 0.000
23:Continental 13.202 12.543 17.512 10.545 10.792 9.075 10.107 5.731 8.799 10.917 11.200 14.489 15.874 14.915 15.512 6.932 5.093 3.622 7.410 2.797 4.901 5.626 0.000
24:Deutsche Telekom 7.258 6.661 10.384 5.184 5.356 4.378 4.980 2.025 4.054 6.405 6.469 9.416 11.441 10.098 10.951 3.307 2.121 1.558 4.075 1.770 3.605 3.293 .945 0.000
25:RWE 6.096 5.488 8.817 4.123 4.253 3.537 4.011 1.371 3.104 5.680 5.680 8.583 10.821 9.350 10.288 2.769 1.739 1.417 3.643 1.912 3.720 3.124 1.496 .064 0.000
Proximity Matrix
Squared Euclidean Distances
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Appendix 4: Results 
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